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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

]

PlaintiffAppellee,

])

vs.

Case No. 20000015CA

]
Priority No. 2

JIMMY LLOYD CRAVENS,
Defendant/Appellant.

]
]

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for Threatening With or Using a Dangerous
Weapon in a Fight or Quarrel, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-506 (1992) and Threats Against Life or Property, a Class B Misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 (1988). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the
defendant's appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution to

inquire whether defendant had any felony convictions after defendant invited inquiry by
his testimony on direct examination and after appearing for trial in a prison jumpsuit?

A trial court's determination on the admissibility of evidence is "generally
accorded a 'good deal of discretion' by an appellate court." State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d
1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994)).
Rulings on evidence are "looked upon with a greater degree of indulgence when the trial
is to the court than when it is to the jury." State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424,431 (Utah
1989) (citation omitted). An appellate court will not reverse an evidentiary determination
unless a "substantial right" of a party has been affected. State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 23
(Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 441 (Utah
1996) (refusing to reverse evidentiary rulings unless there is an abuse of discretion).
2.

Was it plain error for the trial court to allow the defendant to wear a Utah

State Prison jumpsuit at his bench trial when defense counsel made no objection to
defendant's appearance in prison garb?
As defendant admits in his opening brief, this issue was not preserved below.
Absent plain error or exceptional circumstances, issues not raised before the trial court
are waived and cannot be raised on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939
(Utah 1996). To prevail under a plain error standard, a defendant must show (1) that an
error exists; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that the
error is harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); see also State v.
Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Utah App. 1994) (stating an error must be both obvious and
harmful to constitute plain error). An error is harmful if "it undermines . . . confidence in
the verdict or, put another way, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome without the error." State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App. 1993)
2

(citations omitted); accord State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2 at ^ 26, 974 P.2d 269,276 (Utah
1999). The "mere possibility" of a different outcome is not enough to warrant reversal.
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).
3.

Was the evidence so inconclusive or inherently improbable that there was a

reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt?
"The burden is heavy on a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence."
State v. Shepherd, 1999 Utah Ct. App 305 at 125, 989 P.2d 503, 509 (Utah App. 1999)
(citation omitted). A defendant "must first marshal all the evidence supporting the . . .
verdict and then demonstrate how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light,
is insufficient to support the verdict." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App.
1994). When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's
judgment must be sustained "unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1998) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted), aff d by 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911 (Utah 1999); accord State
v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant provisions, statutes, or rules will be cited in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was arrested and charged with Threatening With or Using a Dangerous
Weapon in a Fight or Quarrel and Threats Against Life or Property arising out of an
3

argument with his ex-wife, Rita Cravens, and her friend, Diane Dominguez (R. 12-14).
He was tried to the bench and convicted of both counts (R. 36, Tr. 46).l The trial court
sentenced defendant to one concurrent term of 365 days on Count I and one consecutive
term of 180 days on Count II. (R. 36, 37-38). This timely appeal followed (R. 39-40).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 17, 1997, defendant, Jimmy Cravens, came to the home of Diane
Dominguez in Salt Lake County (Tr. 6-8, 16, 22). Defendant knocked on the door and
loudly demanded to see his wife, Rita Cravens (Tr. 8, 22-23, 26, 31). Rita was present in
Diane's home, along with four other people (Tr. 8, 10). In an effort to protect her, Diane
told defendant that Rita was not at the home (Tr. 8, 24, 25). Defendant responded by
saying "Don't lie, I know she's in there," and then added, "Tell that bitch to get out here
or I'm going to kill you and everyone who is in there." (Tr. 8-9, 11, 24, 35).
After hearing these threats, Diane told defendant to leave or else she would call
the police (Tr. 9, 26). Defendant became angry and started pushing on the door to gain
entrance to Diane's apartment (Tr. 9). At this point, Rita Cravens came to the door to try
to calm defendant and get him to leave (Tr. 9). As Diane tried to pull Rita back into the
apartment, Defendant grabbed Rita, pulled her outside, and pushed her up against a wall
(Tr. 9, 35, 38). He raised a club, approximately 15 to 18 inches long, which he had
previously hidden behind his back (Tr. 9, 10, 34-35, 37). Diane, who observed these

1

Only the first page of the trial transcript has been sequentially paginated with the rest of
the record. Therefore, all references to the transcript of defendant's bench trial will be
cited with a "Tr." designation.
4

events from one or two feet away, ran back into her apartment to call police (Tr. 9, 36,
38).
By the time police arrived at Diane's apartment, defendant had left (Tr. 35-36).
The club was not recovered (Tr. 15).
At trial, defendant testified that he had gone to Diane's apartment because he
wanted to talk to Rita about an earlier fight between Rita and defendant's new girlfriend
(Tr. 20-22). He admitted that he was talking loudly and using vulgar language (Tr. 24,
26), however he claimed that he spoke to Diane and Rita, who were out on a balcony,
from about sixty feet away on the sidewalk (Tr. 24, 30-31). He denied having a club or
grabbing or pushing Rita and accused Diane of not liking him (Tr. 25, 31). He claimed
that Diane had threatened to get him thrown "back in jail" or "back in prison" if
defendant did not leave her apartment (Tr. 26).
On cross examination, the prosecutor asked defendant if he was currently in prison
(Tr. 27). Defense counsel did not object to this question and defendant answered, "Yes."
(Id.). When asked what he was convicted of, defense counsel objected on grounds of
relevance (Id.). The court then took judicial notice of the fact that defendant was wearing
a jumpsuit from the Utah State Prison, and found the State had a good faith basis for
asking about felony convictions (Tr. 28-29). Defendant then admitted that he was
currently serving a prison sentence for burglary and that he was also convicted of armed
robbery in 1980 (Tr. 29). The trial court made it clear that defendant was not required to
name, nor would the trial court consider, any felony convictions which were more than
10 years old (Id).
5

On rebuttal, Diane contradicted defendant's testimony by describing the layout of
her apartment and stating that it did not have a balcony (Tr. 33). She also reiterated her
earlier testimony that defendant had a club in his hand (Tr. 36-37).
In closing argument, defense counsel advanced a theory of self-defense, arguing
that defendant went over to confront Rita in self-defense, and that if he had made any
threats to Diane, Rita, and/or the other occupants of the apartment, they were made in
self-defense. (Tr. 41-42). The defense also asked the trial court to disregard the
references to defendant's felony conviction. (Tr. 43). The trial court stated that it would
consider the burglary conviction only as it may bear on the credibility of Mr. Cravens and
not to the extent it would show some sort of a "predisposition" to commit a crime. (Tr.
43-44).
In finding defendant guilty of both counts, the trial court flatly rejected
defendant's theory of self-defense, finding there was no evidence whatsoever presented
of self-defense. (Tr. 44, 45). The court explained that the case therefore came down to a
question of credibility (Id.), and the court found Diane's testimony to be more credible
than defendant's. (Tr. 45). The trial court found defendant guilty as charged. (Tr. 46).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to inquire whether he had been convicted of a
felony based on his appearance in a prison jumpsuit. However, the prosecutor made this
inquiry only after defendant appeared in prison clothes for trial and after he first testified,
on direct examination, that the State's witness made threats to have him thrown "back in
6

jail" or "back in prison." This topic was therefore appropriate for cross examination.
The trial court also properly considered the applicable Banner factors and used the more
recent burglary conviction, if at all, only to the extent it bore on defendant's credibility.
Finally, defendant suffered no prejudice from this inqi iir> becai ise his trial was to the
bench and any error was harmless.
Second, defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by not asking
him whether he wanted to waive his right to be tried in prison elothini!, despite the I,a I
that his counsel never objected below. The trial court, however, was under no obligation
under Utah or federal law to make this inquiry. There is no evidence or case law which
supports defendant's novel assertion that the right to wear civilian clothing extends to a
bench trial. The concerns which led the Utah Supreme Court to fashion this right injury
trials do not apply in a bench trial setting and the court recently declined to extend this
right to other situations. I he si lpi erne court has also recognized that judges are not
swayed by the same prejudices as juries. Again, any error was harmless.
Finally, defendant claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
convict him of both counts. In this case, the trial coiiiI flatly rejected defendant's selfdefense theory and ruled simply based on the credibility of the witnesses. Determinations
of credibility are squarely within the province of the fact-finder, who is able to view the
witness's demeanor and candoi 01 i the stand In this case, the trial coi irt ob\ iousl> and
with good reason, believed the testimony of the State's witness, who was also a victim,
over the defendant's testimony. The State's evidence, along with the reasonable

7

inferences that could be drawn therefrom, supported the verdict and should therefore be
upheld on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S FELONY
CONVICTION FOR BURGLARY FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE
OF ASSESSING DEFENDANT'S CREDIBILITY.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to inquire
into his prior criminal history simply because he was wearing a prison jumpsuit.
(Appellant's Br. at 9). However, his appearance in prison clothes, coupled with
defendant's testimony on direct examination suggesting that he had been in both jail and
prison, provided the prosecutor with a good faith basis for believing that defendant had
been convicted of a felony. The trial court also appropriately considered and weighed the
relevant balancing factors in determining whether to admit the conviction and considered
the conviction only it may have beared on defendant's credibility. Finally, any error in
admitting evidence of defendant's burglary conviction was harmless.
In this case, it is significant that during the direct examination of defendant the
following exchange occurred:
Q
A
Q
A

Did anyone say that you had to leave the premises?
Yeah. She told me to leave.
Did they ever say that there [sic] were going to put you in jail if you
didn't leave?
She said if I didn't leave then she would have me back in jail and
then a possibility I'd be thrown back in prison for it. I kept telling
them I didn't do nothin'.

8

(Tr. 25-26) (emphasis added). This exchange took place before the prosecutor questioned
defendant about whether he had been convicted of any felonies. By testifying that he
could be thrown "back in jail" or "back in prison," defendant opened the door to
questioning by the prosecutor as to why he was in prison ID I he first place. Cf State v.
Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that when a defendant on direct
examination explores the details of a prior conviction, he opens the door to additional
inquiry by the prosecutor on cross). This testimony, eouploJ with defendant s
appearance in a Utah State Prison jumpsuit, gave the prosecutor a good faith basis for
asking defendant whether he had been convicted of any felonies within the past ten years.
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, the State may introduce evidence of a
defendant's prior convictions under Rule 609. Contrary to defendant's assertion, see
Appellant's Br. at 9, evidence of prior crimes evidence is not presumed to be prejudicial.
See State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at 1ffl 23-24, 993 V M KT M4 (diah pWHdarifying
that that there is no such presumption), cert, denied, 120 S. Ct. 1181 (2000). Evidence
that an accused has been convicted of a felony "shall be admitted if the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial i ffect." IJtah
R. Evid. 609(a)(1). In making this determination, the Utah Supreme Court has suggested
several factors for a trial court to consider, including:
(1) the nature of the crime, as bearing on the character for v eracity of the witness;
(2) the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction;
2

In addition to initiating this exchange during defendant's direct examination, defense
counsel also asked, on cross examination of Diane Dominguez, whether she had
threatened to violate defendant's parole on December 17, 1997. (Tr. 15).
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(3) the similarity of the prior crime to the charged crime, insofar as a close
resemblance may lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad person;
(4) the importance of credibility issues in determining the truth in a prosecution
tried without decisive nontestimonial evidence; and
(5) the importance of the accused's testimony, as perhaps warranting the
exclusion of convictions probative of the accused's character for veracity.
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted).
The defendant in State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611 (Utah App. 1998) similarly argued
that the trial court had improperly failed to undertake the Banner analysis. Id. at 616.
This Court concluded that, to the extent the Banner criteria were applicable, the trial court
complied with the Banner analysis. Id at 617. Specifically, this Court noted that the trial
court considered both the nature of the crime and the similarity between the prior
conviction and the present charge. Id. The trial court also considered another conviction
which was nearly 10 years old and concluded it was too remote to be probative. Id.
Finally, the trial court in Banner considered the fact that the case turned largely on the
defendant's and the alleged victim's credibility. Id This Court concluded that by
considering these factors, the trial court had sufficiently applied the Banner factors.
Here, the record similarly reveals Judge Reese considered and applied these
factors to the extent they were applicable. First, Judge Reese considered both the nature
of and the recentness of the two prior felony convictions mentioned by defendant - the
burglary and the armed robbery (Tr. 29). He concluded that the armed robbery, which
occurred in 1980, was too remote, and stated he would not require defendant to answer
about any charges which were more than 10 years old (Tr. 29). Judge Reese also
considered the fact that this case came down to "a question of credibility" and said he

10

would consider the defendant's burglary conviction only as it might beat on the
defendant's credibility (Tr. 44).3 "Utah courts have allowed impeachment evidence even
though it introduces evidence of a prior bad act if the purpose of the evidence is to affect
credibility." Tucker, 800 P.2d at 824 (citations omitted) B-ecause the trial court's \ erdict
turned mainly on the credibility of the witnesses, Judge Reese did not err in admitting,
and possibly considering, evidence of defendant's prior conviction for burglary.
Finally, it is significant that defendant's trial w as to tl le bench rather than to a jury.
The primary purpose of Rule 609 is to prevent jurors from using a conviction against the
defendant for purposes other than determining the defendant's credibility. See State v.
Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 112-113 (Utah 1985). I In thud Banner factor therefore requires
the trial court to consider the similarity of the prior conviction with the present charge,
"insofar as a close resemblance may lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad person."
Banner, 717 P_

This factor mitigates in favor of admitting defendant's

burglary conviction because "the judge in a bench trial,... acting as a trier of fact, is

3

The trial judge made it very clear that if he considered the defendant's felony
conviction at all, he would consider it only for a limited purpose, stating:
The evidentiary value of the felony convictions only has importance as it
bears on the credibility of Mr. Cravens when he testifies not as it may show
some sort of a predisposition to commit a crime or the fact that he's been
convicted before of a felony in the past few years wouldn't necessarily mean
that he is more likely than not to commit this crime so I will disregard the
argument if, in fact, that's what counsel intended and consider the felony
conviction only as it may bear on the credibility of Mr. Cravens' testimony
here in Court today.
(Tr. 43-44) (emphasis added).
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presumably less likely than a jury to be prejudiced by evidence of prior crimes, wrongs,
or acts." State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989). Evidentiary rulings are
accordingly given a "greater degree of indulgence" when the trial is to the court than
when it is to a jury. Id.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defendant's
burglary conviction after appropriately weighing the applicable Banner factors. In any
event, admitting the conviction was harmless because there is no likelihood that Judge
Reese reached his verdict based on the defendant's conviction for a different crime or that
he may have used it for any other means than to assess credibility.
Nothing in the record indicates that Judge Reese found defendant guilty because of
his prior burglary conviction. In fact, he stated that he would consider defendant's
burglary only to the extent it "may" bear on his credibility. (Tr. 43-44). Moreover, at
trial defendant admitted that he was at the crime scene, that he was very angry with his
wife based on an earlier altercation with his girlfriend, and that he spoke "very loudly"
and used abusive language (Tr. 20-22, 24, 26). To the extent that his testimony
contradicted Diane Dominguez's testimony, it was impeached on rebuttal when Diane
testified that her apartment did not have a balcony (Tr. 33). Finally, the trial court found
there was no evidence whatsoever to support defendant's self-defense theory. (Tr. 4445).
There is thus no reasonable likelihood that defendant would not have been
convicted of both counts notwithstanding the admission of evidence regarding his
burglary conviction. This Court should accordingly affirm both convictions on appeal.
12

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR BY NOT
ASKING DEFENDANT IF HE WISHED TO WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO
BE TRIED IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING WHEN NO SUCH RIGHT
EXISTS UNDER UTAH OR FEDERAL LAW.

Defendant argues that his due process rights were violated when he was required
to wear prison clothes during his bench trial. (Appellant's Br. if I J i I )t• f endant,
however, did not preserve this issue because he never asked that he be allowed to wear
civilian ciodn . during trial. Utah courts have consistently held that absent plain error or
exceptional circumstances, issues not raised before the trial < nul ,m \> am. til and titiiutot
be raised on appeal. See, e,g., State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996).
mt to circumvent the waiver requirement, defendant argues the trial
court committed plain error by not inquiring on its own as to w h\ lie appeared in prtsoi i
clothes. (Appellant's Br. at 3). This Court should reject defendant's arguments for
several reasons.
As a preliminary matter, defendant has not adeqi lateh briefed this issue. He has
given it only cursory treatment in his brief and has cited no legal authority in support of
his position that the right to wear civilian clothing extends to bench trials. The Utah
Supreme Court has clearly stated that "a reviewing ct nul is ciililled to li;ne the issues
clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of research and argument." State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). Utah's appelh i;l e c< >urt s ha\ e decline* I to
address issues with only "superficial citation of authority" or "cursory legal analysis".

13

See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2 at % 13, 974 P.2d 269, 272 (Utah 1999). This
Court should do just that here.
Second, no Utah or federal law or case requires a trial court to inquire into a
defendant's preference for civilian clothing at proceedings conducted outside a jury's
presence. Defendant's argument that "the same prejudicial effect that impacts a jury may
impact a judge" (Br. of Appellant, at 14) (emphasis added), is mere speculation and is not
supported in law or in fact.
In Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held that
trial courts should, on their own initiative, inquire whether a defendant in prison clothes
wishes to waive his right not to appear in such clothes during his trial before a jury. Id at
345. This holding was founded on the court's concern "that two fundamental principles"
of our justice system might be impaired if a defendant appeared in front of a jury in
prison clothes. State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34 at % 15, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 74 (Utah 2000)
(Durham, J. concurring) (citing Chess, 617 P.2d at 344-45). First, the Chess court "was
concerned that a defendant may be presumed by the jury to be guilty merely because the
defendant appeared at trial in prison clothes, a result that undermines the fundamental
principles that all persons are presumed innocent until proven guilty." Id. at *f 16 (citing
Chess, 617 P.2d at 344-45). Second, the Court was concerned that "juries might base
their verdicts on prejudice if the defendant appeared at trial in prison clothes, an outcome
directly contradicting the fundamental principle 'that cases should be decided on the
facts, and not on prejudice, by whatever means the prejudice may insinuate itself.'" Id. at
If 17 (quoting Chess, 617 P.2d at 345).
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The Utah Supreme Court's rationale for fashioning the right tc > not appeal in
prison clothes in the case ofjury trials simply has no logical application to bench trials, or
any other proceedings held solely before trial judges. In holding that a defendant is not
denied due process by virtue of the fact that he wears jail i»;n h rather Hian en iliau dallies
at his bench trial, the Michigan Court of Appeals explained:
the underlying rational in all of these [jury trial] cases was that the
defendant's presumption of innocence would be unduly prejudiced before
the jury if defendant was forced to be tried in prison garb. No such
prejudicial effect could be shown in this case, tried before a judge.
People v. Daniels, 415 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
Because the concerns underlying the court's decision in Chess are not applicable
in a bench trial setting, a trial judge is under no constitutional or procedural obligation to
inquire about a defendant's clothing preference when he is to be tried to the bench.4
Defendant's argument, taken to its logical extent, would require that every time a
defendant appeared in court - whether for an arraignment, a hearing, a trial, or seoteiicing
- he be provided with an opportunity to wear civilian clothing and that the trial court take
his waiver of that right each time. Such a position ignores that judges are not swayed by
the same prejudices that lay jurors might be and does not serve the interests of judicial
expediency. Cf, e ^ , State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424,431 (Utah 1989) (quoting State
v. Park, 17 Utah 2d 90, 40 I I ?c! 677, 679 (1965)) (noting "the judge in a bench trial,. ..
acting as a trier of fact, is presumably less likely than a jury to be prejudiced by evidence
4

This position is supported by supreme court's rejection of recent attempts to expand
Chess. See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35 at If 21 (Utah 2000) (rejecting an "overbroad
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of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts" and therefore evidentiary rulings are given a "greater
degree of indulgence" when the trial is to the court than when it is to a jury).
Finally, defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by appearing
in prison clothing during his bench trial. This Court will reverse under a plain error
theory "only where an error is so prejudicial and so substantial that, absent the error, it is
reasonably probable that the result would have been more favorable for the defendant."
Thomas, 1999 UT 2 at 126, 974 P.2d at 276 (citations omitted); accord State v. Palmer,
860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App. 1993). The "mere possibility" of a different outcome is
not enough to warrant reversal. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).
There is no evidence that defendant was prejudiced by appearing before the trial
court in prison clothing. The trial court undoubtedly knew that defendant was in prison
by virtue of the fact the he had to be transported and escorted to and from the courtroom
by prison officials in handcuffs and shackles. In addition, as noted above, defense
counsel elicited testimony on direct examination that defendant had been in jail and in
prison and that he was on parole at one time, see Tr. at 15, 25-26, thereby inviting further
inquiry from the prosecutor.
Lastly, because the trial court was in a unique position to assess credibility, this
Court should uphold the trial court's decision to believe the State's witness over
defendant. "Trial courts have a broad discretion in matters dealing with the proceedings
in general and with witnesses in particular because from their position they are able to

reading" of Chess and declining to extend right to wear civilian clothes to in-custody
witnesses called by prosecution).
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assess special information, such as nonverbal cues, which is difficult

if not impossible -

for reviewing courts to glean from the record." Thomas, 1999 UT 2 at f 20, 974 P.2d at
274; accord In re J.N., 960 P.2d 403,407 (Utah App. 1998) (giving great deference to
trial court because of its "advantaged positi<

> assessing witness eatiibiltf \ > Judge

Reese's decision to accept the testimony of Diane Dominguez over the defendant's
testimony should therefore not be disturbed on appeal absent evidence to the contrary.
Ill

THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON ^ I IICH TO
CONVICT DEFENDANT OF BOTH COUNTS.

Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of
threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel and threats against life
or property because the State's case rested on the testimony of one witness. I Appellant's
Br. at 15). It is well-settled, however, that fact finders are the sole judges of the weight of
the evidence, and may believe the testimony of one witness against many or many as
againstone. Cf In re Astill's Estate, 14 Utah 2c :i /, j»i F.2d ^X 9

^*

!; J m i t

"hardly necessary to point out" that the preponderance of the evidence is not determined
by the number of witnesses testifying for or against a proposition).
Moreover, the evidence amply supports the trial court's conch isions that defendant
threatened with or used a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel and that he made threats
against life or property. At trial, Diane Dominguez testified that on December 17, 1997,
defendant came to Diane's apartment looking for his wile, Rita | 1 r, h-S). Punic lestified
that when she refused to produce Rita, who was present in Diane's home along with four
other people (Tr. 8, 10), defendant threatened to kill her and everyone else in the house
17

(Tr. 8-9, 11,35). Diane then testified that defendant started pushing on the door, and,
when Rita came to the door, he grabbed Rita, pulled her outside, and pushed her up
against a wall (Tr. 9, 35, 38). Diane saw defendant raise a club above his head in a
threatening manner toward Rita. (Tr. 9, 10, 34-37).
Defendant's testimony largely corroborated Diane's testimony. For example,
defendant admitted that he came to Diane's apartment looking for Rita on December 17,
1997 (Tr. 22). Defendant also admitted that he was angry at Rita because of an earlier
incident between Rita and his girlfriend (Tr. 22). Finally, he admitted that he spoke very
loudly and used vulgar language toward Diane and Rita (Tr. 24, 26).5
Although defendant claimed he never threatened Rita with a club, and that he
stood on a sidewalk sixty feet away while Rita and Diane remained on a balcony, Diane
contradicted this testimony on rebuttal, explaining that her apartment did not have a
balcony (Tr. 33) and she reiterated several times that he was positive defendant had a
club (Tr. 36-37). There was also no evidence of self-defense presented, and the trial
court accordingly dismissed defendant's self-defense argument (Tr. 44-45).
The evidence and the inferences which could properly be drawn from it amply
support the trial court's conclusion that defendant threatened with or used a dangerous

5

Defendant suggests that the State failed to prove defendant possessed the requisite
mental state required for Count II (Appellant's Br. at 16). Intent, however, is rarely
susceptible to direct proof and must often be inferred from the facts and circumstances.
See, e.g., State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992); State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d
295, 296 (Utah 1986). In this case, intent can be inferred from defendant's decision to
confront his wife in a loud and threatening manner and from his testimony that he was
angry at her over the altercation with his girlfriend. There was also no evidence
presented that defendant made threats or otherwise acted accidentally or unintentionally.
18

weapon in a quarrel or fight and that he made threats against life or property. His
convictions for these two counts should therefore be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the defendant's convictions on both counts should be
affirmed.
DATED this P T n day of April, 2000.
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